We confront the two opposing views of capital account liberalization in developing countries with a new firm-level dataset on investment, stock prices, and sales. In the three-year period following liberalizations, the growth rate of the typical firm's capital stock exceeds its preliberalization mean by an average of 5.4 percentage points. The return to capital rises in the post-liberalization period, suggesting that the investment boom does not constitute a wasteful binge. In the cross section, changes in investment are significantly correlated with the signals about fundamentals embedded in the stock price changes that occur upon liberalization. Panel data estimations show that a 1-percentage point increase in a firm's expected future cash flow predicts a 4.1-percentage point increase in its investment; the country-specific shock to the cost of capital predicts a 2.3-percentage point increase in investment; firm-specific changes in risk premia do not affect investment.
Introduction
Broadly speaking, there are two views of capital account liberalization and the invisible hand. The first view sees the invisible hand as discerning. Removing restrictions on international capital movements permits financial resources to flow from capital-abundant developed countries, where expected returns are low, to capital-scarce developing countries, where expected returns are high. The flow of resources into the developing countries reduces their cost of capital, increases investment, and raises output (Fischer, 2003; Obstfeld, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000) .
The second view sees the first as unsubstantiated and regards the invisible hand as indiscriminate. Indiscriminate hand proponents argue that liberalization does not produce a more efficient international allocation of capital. Instead, liberalizations generate speculative capital flows that are divorced from the fundamentals and have no discernible positive effects on investment, output, or any other real variable with nontrivial welfare implications (Bhagwhati, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Stiglitz 1999 Stiglitz , 2002 .
While opinions about liberalization are abundant, facts are scarce (Fischer, 1998) . This paper increases the ratio of facts to opinions by confronting the two views of liberalization with a new data set on investment, stock prices, and sales for 369 firms in a sample of developing countries that opened their stock markets to foreign investment during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Stock market liberalization may seem like a narrow way of defining capital account liberalization relative to the broad indices of capital account openness employed in the literature, but there are several reasons why stock market liberalizations may be better suited to the task at hand. First, broad indices change gradually over time and therefore offer little variation with 3 which to identify the effects of liberalization. Second, broad indices are based on the restrictions applied to an exhaustive list of possible capital account transactions. So, when the index does change, it is not evident which of the myriad possible restrictions has been eased. Without knowing which restriction has been eased, it is unclear how to map the change in the index to a well-articulated model for the purpose of empirical estimation.
Since measurement error reduces the statistical power of any regression, it is important to focus on natural experiments where the true variation in the data is large relative to any noise.
Stock market liberalizations provide just such experiments, because they constitute a radical shift in the degree of capital account openness (Frankel, 1994) . In addition to providing episodes of large changes in capital account openness, focusing narrowly on stock market liberalization offers another empirical advantage. Theory delivers clean predictions about the effect of stock market liberalization on the cost of capital and investment of the firms in the liberalizing countries. The predictions help confront the two opposing views of liberalization with new facts. The fact is uncontroversial. Its interpretation is not.
The boom in Figure 1 might be evidence of a discerning invisible hand allocating capital in response to fundamental changes brought on by liberalization. But Figure 1 might also be evidence of indiscriminacy writ large-overzealous firms collectively engaged in a wasteful investment binge. We attempt to distinguish between these two competing interpretations by analyzing whether the typical firm's post-liberalization investment decision reflects a rational 4 response to the signals embedded in the stock price change that occurs when a country liberalizes (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000a; Stulz, 1999 Stulz, , 2003 Martell and Stulz, 2003) . A change in a firm's stock price signals a change in one or both of the following fundamentals: (1) the firm's cost of capital; (2) the firm's expected future cash flow.
In the pristine world of theory, liberalization changes only the firm's cost of capital, and the change works through two channels. The first is a common shock-a fall in the aggregate risk-free rate as the country moves from financial autarky to world-market integration. The second is a firm-specific "beta" effect. With liberalization, the relevant benchmark for pricing the risk of individual stocks switches from the local stock market index to the world market index. Consequently, the equity premium falls for firms whose returns are less correlated with the world market than they are with the local market and vice versa.
All else equal, the common shock to the cost of capital increases the average investment rate of all firms. Given the common shock, the firm-specific shock implies that firms whose equity premia fall should invest even more than those whose premia rise.
In other words, the beta effect of liberalization is more than an asset-pricing result. A country's switch from financial autarky to optimal international risk sharing also requires the reallocation of physical capital in accordance with the change in the source of its aggregate risk.
We use firm-level data to provide the first empirical test of this prediction.
Typical analyses of the gains from trade in risky assets (the beta effect) calibrate the hypothetical welfare losses associated with the lack of international risk sharing (Lewis, 1999 (Lewis, , 2000 Obstfeld, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 5) . In contrast, this paper examines whether an actual change in a country's ability to share risk internationally alters its allocation of productive resources in accordance with the predictions of neoclassical theory.
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In the murky world of empirical work, stock market liberalizations coincide with other economic reforms such as the easing of trade restrictions that will primarily affect a firm's expected future cash flow. Therefore, it is important to control for the possibility that any postliberalization changes in investment may be driven by reform-induced changes in expected future cash flow. Using a simple open-economy model of Tobin's Q, we decompose firms' postliberalization changes in investment into: (1) changes in expected future cash flow; (2) the change in the risk-free rate; and (3) changes in equity premia. The cross-sectional variation in the data helps identify the economic and statistical significance of each effect.
Much of the cross-sectional evidence supports the discerning view of the invisible hand.
The post-liberalization changes in investment are significantly correlated with changes in our measure of expected future cash flow. A 1-percentage-point increase in the growth rate of a firm's expected future cash flow predicts a 2.9-to 4.1-percentage-point increase in the growth rate of its capital stock, depending on the specification. The common shock to firms' cost of capital is also significant and accounts for a 2.3-percentage-point per-year increase in their capital stock growth. The invisible hand is not all discerning, however, for it pays no attention to risk: Firm-specific changes in equity premia have an economically trivial effect on changes in investment and are statistically insignificant in every specification.
In addition to providing the first attempt at using firm-level data to distinguish between opposing views of liberalization and to test theories of international risk sharing, the paper makes three additional contributions. First, it describes a valuable new source of firm-level data to economists conducting research on the real effects of economic reforms. Publicly available datasets such as Worldscope and Global Vantage contain virtually no data on firms in developing countries before the early 1990s and are therefore not suitable for studying the firm-level impact 6 of the reforms that began in the mid 1980s. In contrast, the firm-level dataset used here spans the pre-and post reform period. 1 Second, firm level data may provide a more transparent view of the channels through which liberalization affects real resource allocation than previous studies that use macro data (Bekaert et al., 2001; Henry, 2000b Henry, , 2003 Levine, 2001; Levine and Zervos, 1998) . Instead of using aggregate investment data as a proxy for the investment of the firms affected by liberalization, we use the investment of only those firms that are listed on the stock market.
Instead of using macro indicators as proxies for the effects of contemporaneous economic reforms on the expected future profitability of investment, we control directly for changes in firms' profitability with the real value of sales and earnings taken from their income statements.
Finally, firm-level data are less susceptible to the issue of endogeneity that clouds the interpretation of macro studies-do liberalizations drive investment booms or does causality run the other way round? A government may decide to liberalize a country's stock market because the economy-wide demand for capital is high, but the liberalization decision is plausibly exogenous to any given firm.
Yes, financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities might lobby the government to permit foreign entry, but it is far from obvious that financial constraints impede the investment decisions of our 369 firms. The firms in our sample are among the 100 largest manufacturing firms in each country, they all issue dividends, and their dividend issuance actually rises following liberalization. If anything, it appears that the firms we study stand to lose from the policy change, because liberalization may provide new sources of financing for their smaller, more financially constrained competitors.
Time Series Facts About Firms, Liberalization, and Investment
Between 1980 and 1994, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) collected annual balance sheet and income statement data for a maximum of the 100 largest publicly traded, nonfinancial firms in eleven developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. When deciding in which countries it would collect data, the IFC employed two screening criteria: (1) quality data had to be available for a reasonably large number of firms; and (2) developing countries from each continent had to be represented. For several countries the sample begins after 1980 because the early years did not contain data of sufficiently high quality.
In order for a country in the IFC database to be included in our sample, it must satisfy one additional criterion. The IFC's data for the country must exist before and after the year in which the country liberalized its stock market. The before-and-after criterion reduces our sample to 369 firms spread across five countries: India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Table 1 uses relative stock market capitalizations to summarize the importance of the firms in the IFC sample for the five countries as a whole. The market capitalization of the 369 firms constitutes 40 percent of their total market capitalization. While the 40-percent figure indicates that the firms in our sample account for a significant fraction of economic activity, the point should not be overstated because publicly traded corporations in developing countries make up a smaller fraction of the economic base than in developed countries.
The IFC database reports the nominal value of net fixed assets (the stock of property, plant, and equipment less depreciation) on an annual basis. In order to obtain the real growth rate of each firm's capital stock, the ideal adjustment procedure would deflate the percentage change in net fixed assets (NFA) by the rate of inflation of each firm's capital goods. Since no 8 such capital goods data exist, we deflate using the Consumer Price Index in three steps. First we take the natural log of nominal NFA at time t+1 and subtract the natural log of NFA at time t.
Second, we take the natural log of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) at time t+1 and subtract the natural log of the CPI at time t. Third, we subtract the second quantity from the first to produce the real growth rate of each firm's capital stock between t and t+1.
1A. Firms Experience Investment Booms in the Aftermath of Liberalizations
We use the data on real capital stock growth to evaluate the statistical significance of the investment spike in Figure 1 . We do so by running a simple panel regression:
ijt INVESTMENT is the real growth rate of the capital stock of firm i in country j in year t . Since all firms in a given country are "clustered' around the same liberalization date, the covariances between individual firms' capital stock growth rate deviations may not be zero. If this is the case, the standard distributional assumptions about the error term, ijt H , no longer obtain. We adjust for clustering by allowing the off-diagonal elements in the variancecovariance matrix, to be different from zero. The estimation procedure also corrects for heteroscedasticity across firms. Table 2 shows that the coefficient on [ ] ij LIBERALIZATION 7 is statistically significant at almost every time horizon. Column (1) presents estimates that include firm-fixed effects. Column (2) presents estimates that include country-fixed effects.
1B. Would a Control Group of Firms Exhibit the Same Spike in Investment?
One should not look at the investment response of firms in liberalizing countries in isolation. If liberalizations coincide with a positive shock to the world business cycle, then the investment of firms in countries that do not liberalize may rise in concert with the investment of firms in countries that do. The ideal attempt to distinguish the effect of liberalization from that of an exogenous shock would compare the investment response of the firms in the liberalizing countries ( Figure 1 ) with a control group-firms in a similar group of developing countries that did not liberalize. Unfortunately, we have no such data.
Since we cannot construct a proper control group, we adopt alternative measures to allow regression (1) to account for the effects of exogenous global shocks. Specifically, Column (3) of On the one hand, the results in Table 2 are not entirely surprising since aggregate capital stock growth rises by 1.1 percentage points per annum in the aftermath of liberalizations (Henry, 2003 Accounting Principles (GAAP). In contrast, Korea and Thailand rely on strict historic-cost accounting as in Germany and Japan (Booth et al., 2001) . In light of these differences, we focus on the percentage changes in Q that occur at liberalization. The last column of Table 1 shows that the average firm experiences a 46.1-percent jump in Tobin's Q at liberalization. The jump in Q does no harm to the discerning view of the invisible hand, but neither does it dismiss the objections of indiscriminate-hand adherents. Specifically, Figure 1 and the data on Q beg the following question.
1D. Is the Investment Boom an Indiscriminate Response to a Stock Market Bubble?
Since the jump in Tobin's Q comes from the increase in stock prices that occurs at liberalization, it is important to remember that stock prices sometimes deviate from their fundamental values (Shiller, 1981 (Shiller, , 2000 . Ramping up investment in response to a stock price bubble may maximize someone's private objective function, but it can hardly be called efficient in a social welfare maximizing sense.
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For example, speculation about the new economy drove US stocks to unprecedented levels in the late 1990s. Many firms used the stock market bubble as a cheap means of raising capital to implement wasteful investment projects that resulted in billions of dollars of excess capacity. The surfeit of fiber optics cable laid by telecom firms is a particularly salient example.
We now know that US firms continued investing en masse, even as the aggregate rate of return to capital was falling precipitously. If inefficient, bubble-driven investment has negative social consequences in the US where capital is relatively abundant, then it will be all the more costly in capital-scarce developing countries.
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In order to assess whether liberalization fosters inefficient investment, we examine the ex-post rate of return to capital. For each firm, we compute the flow return to the stock of capital as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the value of net fixed assets. After computing this ratio for each of the 369 firms, we take a simple average and call it the aggregate rate of return to capital. While Figure 2 appears inconsistent with the notion of indiscriminate, bubble-driven investment, we would expect to see some decline in capital's rate of return as firms buy and install new machinery. Why does this not happen? The answer is that liberalizations coincide with important economic reforms that may increase total factor productivity, economic growth, and the profitability of investment (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Henry, 2003) . Figure 3 demonstrates the point. The growth rate of real sales and real earnings both increase sharply during liberalization episodes.
There is no glaring evidence of inefficiency in the time series profiles of investment and the fundamentals. Yet for the invisible hand to be efficient, it must be discerning not only in the time series but also in the cross section. In turn, cross-sectional efficiency requires that firms' post-liberalization investment decisions systematically reflect the signals about fundamentals that are embedded in the stock price changes that occur at liberalization. Whether or not this is the case is the question to which we now turn. The low value of R-squared indicates a lot of unexplained variation and might be interpreted as evidence of indiscriminacy. But it is important to remember that the principal objective of empirical work is to obtain dependable estimates of the true regression coefficients, not to 14 achieve high values of R-squared (Gujarati, 1988, p. 186) .
Cross-Sectional Facts
Bearing that caveat in mind, equation (2) 
2A. Do Changes in Future Growth Opportunities Drive the Changes in Investment?
In the absence of bubbles (Section 1D), a change in a firm's stock price signals a change in the firm's expected future earnings or its cost of capital. Therefore, it is important to understand whether the post-liberalization changes in investment are correlated with the "news" in expected future growth opportunities. To that end, define i FUTUREGROWTH W as the growth rate of firm i's sales in year W (where W runs from +1 to +3) minus the average growth rate of firm i's sales in years -3 to -1. Equation (3) Again, the economic significance of the unconditional correlation between the left-and right-hand-side variables is nontrivial. News that FUTUREGROWTH for firm i will be 10 percentage points higher predicts that its capital stock growth will deviate from its pre-liberalization mean by 2.95 percentage points.
It is natural to ask whether the predictive power of sales growth for investment during liberalization episodes differs from the predictive power of sales growth for investment at any generic point in time. In order to address the issue, we estimate the following specification:
Note that the variable ijt INVESTMENT is the absolute growth rate of the real capital stock, not deviations of the growth rate from the mean as in equation (3). Similarly, ijt SALESGROWTH is the absolute growth rate of real sales. The reason for not using deviations is that equation (4) attempts to estimate the behavior of investment over the entire sample-not just the postliberalization period-and deviations from the mean over the entire sample will, by definition, be equal to zero.
Equation (4) is similar in spirit to the estimations in Wurgler (2000) . Wurgler's crosssectional exercise examines whether the responsiveness of investment to profitability is higher in countries with more developed financial systems. We ask whether liberalization changes the responsiveness of investment to changes in profitability, taking the country's financial development as given. It would be useful to investigate how a country's financial development affects the ability of firms to respond to liberalization, but with only five countries in our sample there is not enough cross-country variation to address the issue.
If the responsiveness of investment to sales at a generic time, t, is the same as when t is a liberalization year, then the coefficient on Figure 3) ; this shock to profitability may simply provide firms a cash windfall with which to finance projects that they could not implement in the preliberalization period. We now turn to a more thorough investigation of the possibility that the firms in the sample face financial constraints.
2A.1 What if Capital Markets are Not Frictionless?
In a frictionless capital market world, only expected future growth opportunities should matter for investment. If liberalization bodes well for the future, then investment should increase, regardless of the firm's current cash flow. There is ample evidence, however, that current cash flow exerts a significant influence on investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, 1998) . So, an alternative view is that investment rises because liberalizations ease financing constraints by increasing the amount of cash in the firm.
In order to examine whether it INVESTMENTDEVIATION is significantly related to current cash flow we construct a variable called CASHFLOWDEVIATION, which is defined as the growth rate of firm i's sales in year t minus the average growth rate of its sales in years -3 to -1. Equation (5) shows that the coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION is the same order of magnitude as the coefficient on FUTUREGROWTH in equation (3) and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (standard errors in parentheses; adjusted R-squared=0.01; N=1292):
But the interpretation of the coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION is less straightforward.
If firms face financing frictions, investment will be sensitive to current cash flow.
Importantly, however, the converse of the preceding statement need not be true. Sensitivity of investment to current cash flow need not imply that firms face financial constraints. Firms' investment may be sensitive to cash flow, even in the absence of financial constraints that impede their ability to implement optimal investment decisions Zingales, 1997, 2000; Stein, 2003) .
A number of models of corporate investment in the presence of capital market frictions can account for the significant coefficient on CASHFLOWDEVIATION in equation (5), and an attempt to distinguish between all of the competing explanations lies beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Instead we ask the question most germane to the task at hand: Is there any evidence that a lack of access to external finance impedes the invisible hand from optimally allocating investment? While access to external finance would not seem to be an issue for the 100 largest manufacturing firms in a country-large established firms with lots of tangible assets tend to have access to credit-we examine several variables that speak directly to the issue. Begin with dividends. A Firm that pays dividends could invest more by cutting dividends, so it seems unlikely that a dividend-paying firm suffers from capital rationing (Lang and Stulz, 1994) . All of the firms in our sample pay dividends. Furthermore, there is a significant increase in dividend issuance following liberalization (Row 1 of Table 4 ). Again, it 5 See Stein (2003) for a review of the literature on capital market imperfections and corporate investment. 6 Our analysis of access to external finance is similar in spirit to that of Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) .
18 seems unlikely that capital-constrained firms would, on average, increase dividends at the very moment investment opportunities are improving (Figures 2 and 3) . Next, turn to debt. All of the firms in our sample have long-term debt, which again does not suggest an inability to access external finance.
To provide a more general picture of the extent to which the firms in our sample use external sources to finance investment, Table 4 lists several indicative variables: dividends, longterm debt, total external finance, retained earnings, and equity. We construct the ratio of the change in each variable to the change in the stock of net fixed assets (investment). We then calculate the average value of the ratio before liberalization, the average value after liberalization, and test whether the difference between the two averages is statistically significant. Table 4 shows that reliance on external finance rises in the aftermath of liberalizations, but not significantly so. Furthermore, there is a significant increase in reliance on internal funds.
The evidence in Table 4 taken together with the evidence in Section 2A suggests that the firms in our sample increase investment when future growth prospects improve, but they also increase investment when they have a lot of cash. These facts are roughly consistent with what we know about the investment behavior of firms in developed countries (Stein, 2003) . Again, sorting through all the alternative explanations of these facts lies beyond our ambit. Here is the central point: While financial constraints are surely an issue for some firms in the countries we study, there is no glaring evidence that a lack of access to external finance severely impedes the investment decisions of the 369 firms in our sample.
2B. Do Changes in Risk Sharing Drive the Changes in Investment?
Shocks to current and future growth opportunities are only part of the story.
Liberalization may also change a firm's investment, because it alters the firm's cost of capital.
In turn, recall that liberalization affects the cost of capital through two channels: a common shock to the aggregate risk-free rate and a change in the firm-specific equity premium (risk sharing).
For technical reasons, we defer analysis of the common shock until Section 3. Here, we focus on whether the raw data provide any evidence that the invisible hand allocates investment in accordance with changes in risk sharing. To do so, we need a measure of risk sharing. Define Discerning invisible hand advocates might argue that the failure of risk (DIFCOV) to matter for the allocation of physical capital might come about not because the invisible hand is indiscriminate, but because firms face financial constraints that hinder their ability to respond to the liberalization-induced stock price signals. The problem with this explanation is that we have just seen (Section 2A.1) that there is little evidence to suggest that the firms in our sample are financially constrained. Furthermore, there are large increases in investment following liberalization; it is just that DIFCOV does not guide the increases. It is not clear why financial constraints would permit a firm to substantially increase its investment, but prevent it from doing so in a way that incorporates changes in risk.
2B.1 Is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the Relevant Risk-Sharing Benchmark?
Characterizing the invisible hand's insensitivity to risk as evidence of indiscriminacy may seem unjust, because the risk-sharing hypothesis is a hollow straw man. Since there is little evidence to suggest that levels of expected stock returns in the US vary cross-sectionally according to the degree of firms' exposure to aggregate covariance risk, the notion that firms in developing countries allocate physical investment in accordance with the CAPM seems to fly in the face of all common sense.
Yet there is no hiding from economic theory, even for the most practical of considerations (Keynes, 1936, p. 383-84) . All major studies of the gains to trade in risky assets lean heavily on the intuition that covariance risk can be priced (Lewis, 1999 (Lewis, , 2000 Obstfeld, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 5) . Whether the asset pricing model uses a partial equilibrium or general equilibrium consumption-based approach, all of these papers are predicated on the validity of beta-like intuition: The potential gains to international risk sharing stem from the extent to which trade in risky assets permits individuals to smooth covariance risk.
When a liberalization occurs, the relevant benchmark for pricing covariance risk switches from the local stock market index to the world market index. New evidence suggests that the changes in firms' stock returns that occur during liberalizations reflect these changes in covariance risk (Chari and Henry, 2004) . While the stock price changes at liberalization may convey information about changes in risk sharing, the more pressing economic question is whether investment also responds to changes in risk sharing. Optimal smoothing of production risk in an open-capital-market world requires the reallocation of physical capital in accordance with changes in covariance risk. We provide a small step forward by using firm-level data to provide the first empirical test of this prediction.
A Simple Model of Firm-Level Investment, Stock Prices, and Liberalization
This section of the paper generates empirically testable, cross-sectional predictions about firm-level investment, stock prices, and liberalization. It does so by analyzing what happens to the investment of an all equity-financed firm when the country in which that firm resides moves from a regime where foreigners are not permitted to own domestic shares and domestic residents cannot invest abroad, to one where all stocks are fully tradable. 7 We begin by making all of the standard assumptions that are necessary for the CAPM to hold. For expositional convenience,
we also assume that all investors have an identical coefficient of relative risk aversion J . The frictionless capital markets framework highlights the key margins at which liberalization affects firms' investment decisions, but the empirical analysis in Section 4 incorporates the possibility of 7 The results do not hang on this assumption. Chari and Henry (2004) address alternative assumptions.
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financial frictions discussed in Section 2A.1.
3A. Firm-Level Investment Before the Liberalization
Consider a small country in financial autarky. The goal is to use the standard firm-level investment equation (7) i i I a bQ K § · © ¹ to show how liberalization changes a firm's desired investment. Assume that the firm is 100 percent equity financed so that its capital market value equals the stock market value of its equity. Let i S% denote the firm's stochastic cash flow, which is expected to grow exponentially at the rate i g . Since the stock market value of the firm is the present discounted value of its expected future cash flow, we may express Tobin's formula,
, in a more primitive form:
S T
Where i K denotes the number of units of firm i's capital, r is the economy's risk-free interest rate, i S the expected value of i S%, and i the risk premium on firm i's stock.
3B. Firm-Level Investment After the Liberalization
Now suppose that the country opens its stock market to the rest of the world and also allows its residents to invest abroad. Equations (7) and (8) show that liberalization affects investment through its effect on the fundamentals. Interest rates, risk premia, and expected future growth rates may all change instantaneously in response to the news of liberalization. In 23 contrast, the stock of capital, i K , adjusts more slowly because it takes time to buy and install new machines. Hence, define "on-impact" as a period of time that is long enough for asset prices to adjust to liberalization but too short for the capital stock to do so as well, and let * i Q denote the on-impact value of Q for firm i.
A little bit of algebra shows that the on-impact change in Q may be written as: 
. The on-impact change in Q will drive the subsequent adjustment in the firm's capital stock. Since Q has changed, the capital stock must also adjust to reestablish equilibrium. Specifically, the liberalization-induced change in the firm's desired investment, which we denote
In other words, the post-liberalization change in investment can be written as: 
Finally, using the definition of DIFCOV we may rewrite equation (10) The three terms in brackets on the right-hand-side of equation (11) 
Estimating the Investment Response: Methodology and Empirical Results
The i O term in front of the brackets in equation (11) (11) with a random coefficients model that accounts for the firm-specific regression coefficients on sales growth, the common shock, and i DIFCOV .
The problem with random coefficients estimation is that it requires time variation in all of the right-hand-side variables, but DIFCOV is a purely cross-sectional variable. For each firm, i DIFCOV is simply one number-the historical covariance of firm i with the local market minus its historical covariance with the world market. Since we cannot estimate (11) using random coefficients, we begin with a panel specification that ignores the scale effect. Section 4D shows that ignoring the scale effect is inconsequential, so we estimate the following:
Equation (12) (11), we include it in specification (12) because of the evidence in Section 2 that current sales is related to investment. The panel regression pools all firms together, so even though ij DIFCOV does not vary over time for any given firm, it does vary across firms for any given time period. Equation (12) uses precisely this cross-firm variation for any given time period to estimate the coefficient on Column (4) 
4A. Results: Changes in Growth and the Common Shock Matter, Changes in Risk Do Not

4B. Are Changes in the Cost of Capital Irrelevant for Changes in Investment?
While the coefficient on ij DIFCOV in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 is trivial, the constant is significant in 3 of the 4 regressions. So, there is some evidence that the common shock to the cost of capital affects the post-liberalization changes in investment. Having said that, interpreting a significant constant as the impact of the common shock is not without difficulty. In theory, the constant captures the common shock, but in practice it might be picking up the effect of an unobserved regime shift that has nothing to do with a change in the cost of capital-a spike in investment due to some omitted variable that is important for investment but lies outside of our model, for example.
In order to scrutinize whether changes in the cost of capital really matter, Column (5) of 
4C. Robustness: Random Coefficients and a New Definition of Investment Deviations
The regression specifications in Table 5 do not adjust for firm-specific scale effects. In order to examine the robustness of not doing so, we re-estimate a subset of the results using the following random coefficients specification:
Equation (13) (11) to generate a weighted average of the firm-specific OLS coefficients.
If scale effects are important, then the random coefficients estimate of the coefficient on ijt FUTUREGROWTH should differ significantly from the earlier estimate of the coefficient on ijt FUTUREGROWTH that does not adjust for scale effects (Column (2) of Table 5 ). This is not the case. The coefficient on ijt FUTUREGROWTH using random coefficients is 0.167 and significant at the 1-percent level. Similarly, the constant is 0.015 and significant at the 5-percent level.
It is important to ask whether our measure of capital stock growth deviations is sensitive to the choice of the pre-liberalization window. If countries liberalize in response to crises or recessions, then using the three years immediately preceding the liberalization as a benchmark may overstate the abnormal growth rate of the capital stock in the post-liberalization period. Table 6 replicates all of the results in Table 5 using a new left-hand-side variable called ijt INVESTMENTDEVIATION1 , which is defined as the growth rate of firm i's capital stock in year t minus its average growth rate in the entire pre-liberalization period. The results in Table 6 are very similar to those in 
Why Does the Invisible Hand Ignore Risk?
The coefficient estimates on ij DIFCOV , are economically trivial and statistically insignificant in every regression, which suggests that risk sharing has negligible empirical implications for investment. But, in fairness to the discerning invisible hand view, it is possible 31 that the significance of risk sharing is masked by measurement error.
For example, when countries liberalize, some publicly listed firms become eligible for foreign ownership (investible), while others remain off limits (non-investible). Data from the IFC's Emerging Markets Database show that DIFCOV robustly explains the change in the cost of capital for investible firms, but is never significant for the non-investible ones (Chari and Henry, 2004) . Therefore, it is possible that changes in investment are significantly correlated with DIFCOV for the investible firms, but the relation is masked because the investible and noninvestible firms are grouped together in our sample.
The investible and non-investible firms are grouped together in our sample, because the should encourage firms to implement high growth projects that were too risky to adopt in autarky (Obstfeld, 1994) .
The expression for the liberalization-induced change in a firm's cost of capital provides one possible explanation for why the data do not support this prediction:
Suppose that liberalization reduces the risk-free rate by 10 percentage points and that the
FRHIILFLHQW RI UHODWLYH ULVN DYHUVLRQ WDNHV RQ D YDOXH RI 6LQFH WKH DYHUDJH YDOXH RI
i DIFCOV in our sample is 0.015, the average firm-specific change in the cost of capital will be 3 percentage points (2 times 0.015), which means that the total fall in the cost of capital is 13 percentage points. The common shock, however, accounts for roughly 80 percent of the change.
This simple numerical example illustrates a fundamental point. If the common shock dominates the firm-specific shocks then changes in the cost of capital will display little crosssectional variation and i DIFCOV will not have much explanatory power.
Conclusion
The time series facts support the view that liberalization permits capital to move efficiently across countries. The cross-sectional evidence, on the other hand, is mixed. Changes in investment are significantly related to changes in cash flows, but if more extensive firm-level data were available they might reveal more evidence of indiscriminacy. Our dataset consists only of firms that are traded on the stock market. Publicly traded firms may be more responsive to market forces than those that are privately held (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . If privately held firms account for a significant fraction of economic activity, then our results may have limited applicability.
Furthermore, changes in risk sharing are not significant. It is hard to argue that capital is efficiently allocated within countries when the invisible hand appears insensitive to risk.
Indiscriminate hand adherents will fairly point out that we have not addressed the question of whether liberalizations impose long-run real costs in addition to the short-run benefits documented here. The data in this paper pre-date the developing country capital market crises of the mid-to late-1990s. While it is not clear that stock market liberalizations per se were the proximate cause of these crises, which occurred almost ten years later, the available data do not permit us to address the issue directly.
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There is also a great deal of variation in changes in investment that remains to be explained. Previous work suggests some fruitful directions. Firms in industries that are more dependent on external finance may show the largest post-liberalization increases in investment (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Other explanations could be related to the political economy of liberalization. Firms that receive preferential government treatment may be better positioned to 34 raise stock market financing than other firms (Johnson and Mitton, 2001; Johnson et al. 2000) .
In turn, preferential treatment may determine which firms are opened up to foreign investment in the first place Zingales, 2001, 2003) .
Neither data nor space permits us to pursue such explanations at this time. Nevertheless, the evidence in this paper does bring us a step closer to understanding whether investment is efficiently reallocated when countries remove barriers to international capital movements.
Applied to better data in the future, the firm-level identification strategy developed here may
bring us yet nearer. Notes: Column 1 presents the fraction of total market capitalization that the firms in our sample represent as a fraction of total market capitalization in the respective countries. The total market capitalization represents the value of all publicly traded companies on the domestic exchange in the liberalization year. Column 2 gives the number of firms in each country. Column 3 contains the liberalization date for each country in our sample; the liberalization dates are taken from Henry (2000a Henry ( , 2000b Henry ( , 2003 . the cumulative coefficient estimate for the four years taken together. The left-hand-side variable is the first difference of the log of the capital stock (investment). Column (1) presents the coefficient estimates for the regression specification that controls for firm-fixed effects. Column (2) presents the coefficient estimates for the regression specification that controls for country-fixed effects. Column (3) controls for world business cycle effects: the contemporaneous growth rate of OECD industrial production, the three-month real US Treasury bill rate, and the 10-year real US government bond rate Column (4) incorporates controls for both firm-fixed effects and world business cycle effects. All specifications control for clustering in the error structure. The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. SALESGROWTH is measured as the first difference of the log of contemporaneous sales for any given firm over the entire sample period. FUTURESALES1 and FUTURESALES2 measure the first and second leads of the growth rate of sales which is defined as the first difference of the log of sales. LIBERALIZATION is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the liberalization year and the three years following it. All interactions terms between the SALES variables and the liberalization dummy measure the change in the elasticity of the investment response to sales growth during the liberalization window. The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. j CNTRY represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects. All specifications control for clustering in the error structure. The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. CNTRY represents a set of country specific dummies that control for country fixed effects. All specifications control for clustering in the error structure. The symbols (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
